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Russian army justifies its reforms
Andrzej Wilk
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- 
-February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at 
testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship 
task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand 
out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s re-
cent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial 
span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last 
combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The in-
tensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged 
are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam 
war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following 
the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution.
Unusually intensive military activity
The Russian army trains in two semi-annual 
cycles – the summer cycle and the winter cy-
cle. During the winter training period (from 
1 December to 31 May), units of all service 
branches concentrate mainly on basic train-
ing of soldiers and units (seamen and crews 
in the Navy). Those drills are usually designed 
as preparations to operational and strategic- 
-level exercises of the joint forces (which involve 
units from at least two service branches), or-
ganised in summer and early autumn. Exercises 
in the winter training period that involve more 
than one thousand troops and are joint forces 
drills (i.e. drills in which units of, for instance, 
the Land Forces and the Air Forces co-operate, 
rather than simply serving as targets for each 
other) have been organised only sporadically in 
the winter period. Firing-range drills are usually 
planned at least one year in advance, while de-
ciding the structure of expenses for the given 
budgetary period, and immediate preparations 
to such drills take two to three months. Towards 
the end of the previous decade the Armed Forc-
es of the Russian Federation reached the level of 
training activity comparable to that of the Sovi-
et army, account being taken of the differences 
in size. Since then, the scale of exercises and the 
numbers of troops involved and military equip-
ment employed had remained relatively stable.
In this context, the unannounced tests of com-
bat readiness that have been taking place since 
mid-February have no precedent in the history 
of the Russian Armed Forces. They have been 
held in addition to the standard training activ-
ities during the winter training season (accord-
ing to official figures of the Defence Ministry, 
a total of 10 thousand exercises were held 
during the 2013 winter training season, includ-
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ing 170 firing-range drills1) throughout the ter-
ritory of Russia, involving all service branches. 
Moreover, they have been held as exercises of 
joint forces. The largest drills (see Appendix) in-
volved anywhere between 1 thousand and over 
8 thousand troops, and the participating units 
had had not more than two weeks to prepare. It 
should be emphasised that the two-week dead-
line was reported by the Russian media on the 
occasion of the most widely publicised exercise 
which took place in March in the north-east-
ern part of the Black Sea (and in which Vladimir 
Putin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, himself took part) amid allegations that 
Russian military units were not able to act im-
mediately and that ‘unannounced tests’ to date 
had in fact been a fiction2. As the exercises 
were in fact held as drills of the joint forces, 
such a short timeframe must have been a major 
mobilisation and logistics challenge. The situ-
ation has not changed with the beginning, on 
1 June, of the summer training period – the 
combat readiness tests are continuing3.
The involvement of the Russian Navy in the 
eastern Mediterranean is a specific kind of ac-
tivity in this context. Unlike in the case of the 
drills, which are voluntary, Russia has been 
forced to built its presence in the region due to 
the external situation, i.e. the civil war in Syria, 
Russia’s last foothold in the Middle East. Rus-
sia’s presence in the Mediterranean in connec-
1 TASS, 1.06.2013.
2 http://izvestia.ru/news/547687
3 More than 500 firing-range-drills have been scheduled 
in the summer training cycle (starting on 1 June 2013), 
40% of which will be joint operations (from battalion 
level upwards). Interfax, TASS, 30.05.2013.
tion with the Syrian conflict has been mounting 
since 2011, but since the beginning of this year 
it has taken the form of a de facto permanent 
task force numbering, depending on the peri-
od, from several to more than a dozen warships 
and auxiliary units, mostly originating from the 
Black Sea Fleet. It should be emphasised that 
the Black Sea Fleet was also one of the main 
participants of the combat readiness test in 
March, making it one of the most active forma-
tions in the whole Russian Armed Forces next to 
the Airborne Troops and the air transport units.
Conclusions about the Armed Forces’ 
condition
The unannounced combat readiness tests and 
the stepped-up presence of the Russian Navy 
in the Mediterranean are an indication that 
– in line with the objectives of the reforms – 
at least some parts of the Russian army have 
reached the expected level of permanent read-
iness. One of the main indications suggesting 
that the results of the tests were satisfactory 
is the absence of reshuffles, especially in the 
higher-ranking command positions (other than 
promotions: some of those who have taken 
part in the tests have been promoted to higher 
ranks in a ceremony held on the occasion of the 
Russia Day celebrated on 12 June). If there had 
been any serious problems, it would have been 
necessary to hold someone to account for the 
shortcomings, especially in a situation in which 
Russia’s top leadership was directly interested 
in the outcome of the drills.
The capabilities of the training formations in-
creased with the successive tests and – despite 
the criticism that has been spelt out – deserve 
to be assessed as relatively high. Most of the 
problems occurred during the first, unpubli-
cised large combat-readiness test organised in 
mid-February in the Central Military District. 
The drills (marches, firing-range exercises) ex-
posed insufficient co-ordination between the 
combat units and the support units. They also 
The unannounced combat readiness 
tests that have been taking place since 
mid-February have no precedent in the 
history of the Russian Armed Forces.
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revealed the poor technical condition of some 
weapons and items of military equipment (for 
example, three Mi-24 helicopters, one Mi-8 
helicopter and two “Msta-S” self-propelled 
howitzers failed to start, and two BMD-2 in-
fantry fighting vehicles broke down during as 
the troops were moving4). The announcement 
made by the Defence Ministry leadership that 
the exercise in the Central Military District was 
the beginning of a series of tests allowed the 
other units to make up for any deficiencies in 
advance (in particular, to assess the condition 
of their equipment and arms) and get prepared 
to possible involvement in drills just in case (ir-
respective of whether they ultimately partici-
pated or not). The official declaration that a se-
ries of unannounced tests would be launched 
was a deliberate warning to the commanders 
of military formations and units. This, however, 
does not change the fact that the units which 
took part in the drills demonstrated their abil-
ity to take previously unplanned action within 
a relatively short timeframe. The warning from 
the Ministry of Defence gave them additional 
weeks at best, whereas previously, they would 
know about drills months in advance. Anoth-
er indication that the combat readiness tests 
had not been included in the original training 
plans comes from the announcement of depu-
ty prime minister Dmitry Rogozin who said on 
7 June that it would be necessary to include ad-
dition ordnance purchases in the 2013 budget5.
4 Interfax, TASS, 22.02.2013; http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2165566
5 Interfax, TASS, 7.06.2013.
This announcement also proves that during the 
drills, Russian troops used their most state-of-
the-art guided weapons (Russian arsenals are 
still full of Soviet-made munitions).
Based on the outcomes of the unannounced 
drills and the activities of the Russian Navy in 
the Mediterranean it is possible to name those 
formations (and their constituent units) which 
have reached the level of so-called permanent 
readiness in the current cycle of reforms and – 
in the case of the conventional forces – meet 
the criteria for rapid reaction forces. At the core 
are the Airborne Troops (all formations of this 
service branch took part in the tests) and the 
61st Air Army co-operating with them (provid-
ing air transport), as well as the Marines bri-
gades (part of the Navy) and the commandos 
(SpecNaz GRU). At least some sub-units in the 
formation of the Air Force and the Aerospace 
Defence Forces are in permanent readiness 
mode, and so are units in the land, maritime and 
air components of the strategic nuclear forces. 
In the Navy, most units in active service main-
tain permanent readiness (probably all units in 
the Black Sea Fleet), with special focus on the 
anti-submarine component and the amphibi-
ous forces (in connection with the operations in 
Syria). It is notable that the unannounced tests 
involved the Land Forces to a lesser extent, 
and mainly consisted in checking their ability 
to reach higher levels of combat readiness, but 
with limited firing-range activity6.
It is therefore justified to assume that the Rus-
sian Army has the capacity to carry out missile 
and air strikes (and defend itself against such 
strikes), as well as short joint (air, land and mari-
time) operations without lengthy, visible prepa-
rations. Considering the potential of the Air-
borne Troops (35 thousand soldiers7, armoured 
fighting vehicles, artillery with 100 mm and 
higher calibres) and the Marines (8 thousand8; 
6 Probably only two brigades of the Central and Southern 
Military Districts actively participated in the largest ex-
ercises that have been reported.
7   http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=292242
8 ht tp: / / war fa re .be / ?lang=rus&cat id=239& l ink-
id=2240&linkname=Voenno-Morskojj-Flot
The warning from the Ministry of Defence 
gave the units participating in the drills 
additional weeks at best, whereas previ-
ously they would have known about the 
drills months in advance.
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same equipment as Airborne Troops, plus 
tanks), the Armed Forces of the Russian Feder-
ation would be capable, in an urgent situation, 
to carry out an operation on a scale comparable 
with the 2008 Russian-Georgian war.
Conclusions serving to justify reforms
In his comments about the exercise in the north-
east region of the Black Sea president Vladimir 
Putin said in mid-April that he found the out-
comes satisfactory, and congratulated the com-
manders and the soldiers. Similar opinions were 
expressed about the following exercise – the 
air defence drill in the Western Military District 
in May. Nonetheless, the civilian and military 
leaders of the Armed Forces have formulated 
a number of critical conclusions, emphasising 
the need to make up for some shortcomings, 
especially in the context of the Russian-Belaru-
sian “Zapad” exercise scheduled in September 
2013. The official comments, though, were not 
so much an assessment of actual shortcomings, 
as a justification for sticking to the current di-
rection of reforms in the Russian army.
The main problem raised in the assessments 
formulated by president Putin, and also by the 
first deputy minister for defence, army gener-
al Arkady Bakhin (in charge of troops training 
and reform of the command system) concerned 
flaws of the command and control systems and 
procedures, especially during joint operations 
involving different service branches under sin-
gle command9. According to Bakhin, the tests 
have also revealed poor preparedness of the 
combat-support and support units (reconnais-
sance, engineering, chemical, biological, ra-
diological and nuclear defence and logistics) 
to take part in general operations (cf. the unit 
co-ordination problems mentioned before), but 
in his opinion the blame for this lies with the 
commanders of the combat formations who 
9 Interfax, TASS, 13.05.2013.
have insufficiently included the support units in 
their training plans10. Such criticism should be 
interpreted as signalling an intention to speed 
up the modernisation aimed at implementing 
new, automated command systems (which are 
officially expected to become fully operational 
in 2020). More importantly, it should be regard-
ed as a confirmation of the current direction of 
changes in the military, aimed at transferring 
command competences to the so-called joint 
forces commands, as it is the case in the best 
Western armies, while limiting the compe-
tences of the commands of individual service 
branches (a move that continues to be criticised 
in Russia).
Similar criticism has been voiced by the Chief of 
General Staff, army general Valery Gerasimov, 
who nonetheless focused more on military 
technology issues and reasons for the frictions 
between the Defence Ministry and the arms in-
dustry. According to Gerasimov the failures of 
arms and military equipment proved that the 
army was right to create overhaul units within 
its structures. The poor condition of the largely 
worn-down equipment calls for continued tech-
nological modernisation, especially in terms 
of increasing the budgets for new arms and 
military equipment purchases. Gerasimov has 
also directly attacked the arms industry (after 
the change of leadership in the Defence Min-
istry in November 2012, the expectation was 
rather that the army would make concessions 
to the Military-Industrial Complex, as the com-
10 Interfax, 24.05.2013.
The official critical comments were not 
so much an assessment of actual short-
comings, as a justification for sticking 
to the current direction of reforms in the 
Russian army.
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panies that overhaul arms have been blamed, 
not without reason, for the low quality of the 
products and services offered (the helicopters 
which failed to start had been overhauled in 
mid-2012; and defects were also detected in 
attack aircraft, self-propelled howitzers and ra-
dars still covered by warranty)). Gerasimov also 
reminded that the new products offered by the 
defence industry often failed to meet the ex-
pectations of the military11.
As regards the heightened activity of the Rus-
sian Navy off the coast of Syria, the main con-
clusion seems to be the decision to create (the 
Russians use the word “recreate”, referring back 
to Soviet times) a permanent warship task force 
in the Mediterranean as of 2014, as announced 
by admiral Victor Chyrkov, the Command-
er-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, on the occasion 
of the 230th anniversary of the Black Sea Fleet 
celebrated in Sevastopol (such a taskforce has 
been in de facto existence for several months). 
Not later than in May, the Navy started forming 
the Staff of the prospective task force, which 
would ultimately consist of 5 to 6 warships and, 
possibly, two submarines and a Mistral-class 
amphibious-assault ship (the presence of the 
latter unit in the taskforce is currently purely 
hypothetical)12. It is possible that the decision 
to form a permanent taskforce of the Russian 
Navy in the Mediterranean is a mere political 
demonstration related to the current political 
situation (once the civil war in Syria is over, 
11 Interfax, TASS, 22.02.2013.
12 TASS, 13.05.2013.
the rationale for activities of Russian warships 
off the Syrian coast will disappear). However, 
in view of the fact that the Staff of the task-
force is being created, and that the decision to 
establish it has been compared to the decision 
to resume the strategic bomber patrols in 2007, 
it is reasonable to assume that, subject to its 
financial capabilities, Russia is thinking about 
a permanent warship presence in the long 
term, in the context of its efforts to rebuild its 
position as a military power (back in the Soviet 
times, the 5th Escadrille in the Mediterranean, 
dismantled in 1992, provided counterbalance 
to the United States’ 6th Fleet).
On 24 May general Bakhin announced that the 
Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu had asked for 
corrections to be made in the training plan for 
the summer period that would reflect the re-
sults of the unannounced tests13. The correc-
tions, however, are not expected to have a sig-
nificant impact on the training process (while 
they will impact financial issues; see below), 
as the large firing-range drills to be held in 
the summer period have already been planned 
in 201214 and preparations for them are most 
probably already underway (joint forces drills 
have been scheduled in all military districts). 
Likewise, it is doubtful if more military units will 
be involved in them on an unannounced-test 
basis (especially as regards the most widely 
publicised Russian-Belarusian “Zapad” exercise, 
whose success is a matter of prestige).
Reasons for the stepped-up activity
The intensified activities of Russia’s Armed 
Forces should be considered mainly in the con-
text of internal politics. The corruption scandals 
which have led, in November last year, to the 
replacement of the Defence Minister, as well as 
13 Interfax, 24.05.2013.
14 In the aftermath of the unannounced tests the decision 
was taken to extend the training time of recruits by one 
month (to four months) and to step up the intensity of 
physical training, however, this does not have a direct 
bearing on the drills planned in the summer training cy-
cle. Interfax, 24.05.2013.
Once the civil war in Syria is over, the ration-
ale for the activities of the Russian warships 
off the Syrian coast will disappear. However, 
Russia is thinking about a permanent war-
ship presence in the Mediterranean in the 
long term, in the context of its efforts to re-
build its position as a military power.
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the open criticism of the current direction of re-
forms (especially the abandonment of the mass 
army model and changes in the system of com-
mand) have done some damage to the image 
of the Russian army. The readiness tests pro-
vided an opportunity to demonstrate that the 
corruption scandals (which mostly concerned 
the privatisations of back-up facilities inherited 
from the Soviet army and the commercialisa-
tion of services for the army) had not negatively 
affected the combat capabilities of the Russian 
Armed Forces, and that the reforms have in-
creased the army’s efficiency. President Putin’s 
comment that one of the objectives of the drills 
had been to check if the funds for modernisa-
tion, including infrastructure, had been well 
spent and to determine what else needed to be 
done, was an accurate reflection of reality.
The unannounced tests should also be seen as 
self-promotion for the current leadership of the 
Defence Ministry, including in particular Sergey 
Shoygu (on 27 May he decided that detailed 
information on the drills should be made avail-
able to the media15), and President Putin him-
self (modernisation of the army is seen as one 
of the priorities of Russia’s policy, not only in 
terms of defence, but also in terms of economic 
and social policy). Putin was directly involved in 
the Black Sea exercises and issued the order for 
the drill to start from onboard his plane while 
returning from South Africa, a fact dutifully 
noted by all Russian media. He also observed 
one of the firing-range phases of the exercise – 
the drill of the airborne units. Finally, in mid-
May he held an unprecedented series of meet-
ings with the top commanders of all service 
branches in the Russian Armed Forces.
As Russia’s economic growth is slowing down, 
forcing the country to seek spending cuts in 
the coming years, the army’s readiness tests 
should also be seen as a way to justify contin-
ued increasing of military spending. It should 
be noted that if the current financial provisions 
concerning the modernisation of the Russian 
15 Interfax, TASS, 27.05.2013.
Armed forces are kept in place, military spend-
ing will have to grow faster than Russia’s GDP 
in the coming years. This problem has not been 
solved by the transfer of some funds from the 
State Armaments Programme for 2011-2020 
to the period beyond 2016, agreed between 
the Ministries for Finance and for Defence16. 
The army has suspended purchases because 
of delays on the part of the defence compa-
nies, and the transfer should largely be seen 
as a way to pressure the producers of arms17. 
Major budget savings could be generated by 
addressing the fact, revealed in the course of 
the unannounced tests, that the army had been 
overstating its training costs. During the pros-
perity of the recent years military units would 
receive funding for munitions, fuels, lubricants, 
spare parts, etc. in amounts corresponding to 
their target numbers of posts, irrespective of 
the actual manning levels. During his visit to 
the Central Military District on 24 May general 
Bakhin announced that in successive exercises, 
the allocations of funds would have to reflect 
the actual manning levels. In the justification he 
said that the current practice was blurring the 
picture needed for the purposes of transitions 
to wartime manning levels18.
16 TASS, 14.06.2013.
17 In line with the plans that were discussed during works 
on the current budget, the transfers will most probably 
affect around 10% of the funds for the years 2014-2016, 
which corresponds to the percentage of orders that 
were not completed. http://www.minfin.ru/common/
img/uploaded/library/2012/12/FZ216-FZ_ot_031212.pdf
18 Interfax, 24.05.2013.
The readiness tests provided an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that the corruption 
scandals involving the Defence Ministry 
had not negatively affected the combat ca-
pabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, and 
that the reforms have indeed increased the 
army’s efficiency.
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The external policy aspect of the tests is of sec-
ondary importance. Of the eight largest previ-
ously unplanned firing-range drills (as of the 
end of May), the Russian media extensively cov-
ered only two: the March drill in the Black Sea 
and the May air defence exercise in the Western 
Military District. This was directly related to the 
developments between Moscow and Washing-
ton (Russia–NATO), and especially the mount-
ing dispute over the way to end the civil war in 
Syria, and the fact that the United States was 
continuing works on its missile defence system 
(the combat-readiness test of the strategic nu-
clear forces should also be seen in the context 
of the latter issue). The activity of the Russian 
Navy off the coast of Syria is the only exception 
– it has been part of Russia’s external policy 
from the start.
Conclusions
The heightened activity of the Russian Armed 
Forces has demonstrated that they have a rela-
tively large number of units in different service 
branches which have already achieved the level 
of combat readiness defined at the onset of the 
current cycle of reforms. Those units are capable 
of carrying out tasks away from where they are 
deployed without long and visible preparations, 
and are in a position to carry out an operation 
on the scale of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war.
The unannounced test of combat readiness 
are intended primarily to demonstrate that the 
reforms of the Armed Forces, initiated in the 
mid-2010s, are purposeful and effective, and to 
provide a rationale for continuing the reforms, 
including in particular the costly technical mod-
ernisation. The latter objective is particularly 
important in the context of Russia’s slowing 
economic growth and the need to seek budget 
savings in the coming years.
The way the military exercises have been cov-
ered by the Russian media suggests that they 
were also aimed at improving the image of 
President Putin and to build a sense that Rus-
sia is under a military threat from the United 
States (which again can be considered in the 
context of the need for a rationale to increase 
military spending). The external dimension of 
the heightened military activity, related espe-
cially to the situation concerning Syria, should 
be seen as having only secondary importance.
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Major unannounced combat readiness 
tests (before 31 May)
17–21 February – exercise in the Central Mili-
tary District (Joint Strategic Command “Tsentr”) 
with units from the Southern Military District, 
the Airborne Troops, the air transport units as 
well as the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan and 
the 12th Directorate General of the Russian Fed-
eration Ministry of Defence responsible for the 
security of nuclear facilities. Around 7 thousand 
soldiers, several hundred fighting vehicles and 
48 aircraft and helicopters were involved in the 
firing-range phase.
12–17 March – combat readiness test of the 
Eastern Military District, involving units of the 
36th Army, 3rd Air and Air Defence Forces Com-
mand and the Pacific Fleet.
25–29* March – exercise of the 7th Rocket Di-
vision of the Strategic Missile Troops (Ozernyy, 
Tver Oblast)
28–31 March – drills in the north-eastern Black 
Sea and the Southern Military District involv-
ing the Black Sea Fleet, the Airborne Troops, air 
transport units and the SpecNaz GRU forces. 
At least 7.1 thousand soldiers, 250 fighting ve-
hicles, 50 artillery units, 20 aircraft and helicop-
ters as well as 36 warships and support units 
took part in the firing-range phase of the exer-
cise (on 29 March around 20 warships and 30 
support units were de facto at sea, and 20 air-
craft and helicopters operated from the bases 
in Crimea alone).
16–18 April – exercise of the 76th Airborne 
Division (Pskov)
22–26* April – exercise of the Northern Fleet 
(Barents Sea)
20–24 May – exercise of the 29th Rocket Divi-
sion of the Strategic Missile Troops (Irkutsk)
27–30 May – exercise in the Western Military 
District involving the Aerospace Defence Forces, 
1st Air and Air Defence Forces Command, air 
transport units and strategic air units. The fir-
ing-range phase (some drills were carried out 
in a missile firing range in the Southern Military 
District) involved 8700 soldiers, 185 combat air-
craft and 240 armoured fighting vehicles.
(*) Estimated end of exercise
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